Anett John
Assistant Professor (Lecturer)
Department of Economics, University of Birmingham
Affiliate, CREST and ENSAE Paris
PhD 2014, London School of Economics
Research
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Main Fields
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Secondary Fields
Health Economics,
Public Policy Evaluation
References
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Prof. David Laibson
Prof. Imran Rasul
Prof. Marie-Claire Villeval
Contact
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University of Birmingham
Economics Department
University House
Birmingham, B15 2TY
United Kingdom
E-mail: A.John@bham.ac.uk
Curriculum vitae
Research
Fieldwork team for my Commitment Savings project - September 2012, Philippines
My research applies behavioural models to topics in development economics, such as microfinance, human capital, and health. I am particularly interested in behavioural barriers to economic investment decisions. A strong past focus has been the impact of time preferences and self-control on individuals' lives. More recently, I am studying the importance of individuals' beliefs about themselves (captured in psychological concepts like agency and self-efficacy) for economic decisionmaking. Applications extend beyond developing countries to disadvantaged populations in high-income countries, such as unemployed youths in France. My methodology of choice are randomized field experiments that are firmly grounded in economic theory.
Papers
Can Simple Psychological Interventions Increase Preventive Health Investment?
Ungated Version (includes Online Appendix)
Coverage: J-PAL Summary, Podcast (in progress), VoxDev (in progress)
Coverage: J-PAL Summary, Podcast (in progress), VoxDev (in progress)
Abstract
Behavioral constraints may explain part of low demand for preventive health products. We test the effects of two light-touch psychological interventions on water chlorination and related health and economic outcomes using a randomized controlled trial among 3750 women in rural Kenya. One intervention encourages participants to visualize alternative realizations of the future; one builds participants' ability to make concrete plans. After 12 weeks, visualization increases objectively measured chlorination, reduces diarrhea episodes among children, and increases savings. Effects on chlorination and savings persist after almost three years. Effects of the planning intervention are weaker and largely insignificant. Analysis of mechanisms suggests both interventions increase self-efficacy – beliefs about one's ability to achieve desired outcomes. Visualization also increases participants' skill in forecasting their future utility (Gabaix and Laibson 2017). The interventions do not differentially affect beliefs and knowledge about chlorination. Results suggest simple psychological interventions can increase future-oriented behaviors, including use of preventive health technologies.
When Commitment Fails - Evidence from a Field Experiment
Abstract
Commitment products can remedy self-control problems. However, imperfect knowledge about their preferences may (discontinuously) lead individuals to select into incentive-incompatible commitments, which reduce their welfare. I conduct a field experiment where low-income individuals were randomly offered a new installment-savings commitment account. Individuals chose a personalized savings plan and a default penalty themselves. A majority appears to choose a harmful contract: While the average effect on bank savings is large, 55 percent of clients default, and incur monetary losses. A possible explanation is that the chosen penalties were too low (the commitment was too weak) to overcome clients' self-control problems. Measures of sophisticated hyperbolic discounting correlate negatively with take-up and default, and positively with penalty choices – consistent with theoretical predictions that partial sophisticates adopt weak commitments and then default, while full sophisticates are more cautious about committing, but better able to choose incentive-compatible contracts.
Abstract
Flexible repayment schedules allow borrowers to invest in profitable yet risky projects, but practitioners fear they erode repayment morale. We study repayment choices in rigid and flexible loan contracts that allow discretion in repayment timing. Using a lab-in-the-field experiment with microcredit borrowers in the Philippines, we separate strategic repayment choices from repayment capacity, and thus identify moral hazard. We quantify social pressure, which is considered both central to group lending, and excessive in practice. In our rigid benchmark contract, repayment is much higher than predicted under simple payoff maximization. Flexibility substantially lowers both repayment and social pressure. Our results are consistent with a strong social norm for repayment, which is weakened by the introduction of flexibility. We support this interpretation with theoretical and empirical evidence. This implies that cooperative behavior determined by social norms may erode if the applicability of these norms is not straightforward.
Abstract
Youth participation in programs designed to enhance their employability is usually low. This paper reports the results from a large randomized experiment in which young, unskilled jobseekers in France receive a monthly cash transfer for a two-year period totaling up to €4,800, conditional on their participation in the French national career guidance program. Cash transfers lead to a significant increase in program participation (which mainly entails meetings with counselors), and sharply reduced drop-out rates. As a result, there is a large increase in the job offers, vocational training and career building workshops proposed to the young jobseekers. However, the jobseekers' response to these increased opportunities for employability investment is a precisely estimated zero. Moreover, we observe a significant reduction in employment over the first six months and only a minor increase in income. The results point to a strong impact of financial incentives, but also to the need to design more sophisticated incentive schemes if the goal is to improve employability investments.
Abstract
Empirical evidence from developing countries suggests that there is a high demand for informal savings mechanisms even though these often feature negative returns - such as deposit collectors, ROSCAs, microloans, and informal borrowing. Why do people not just save at home, instead of relying on such costly devices? In a savings model with hyperbolic discounting and uncertainty, I show why a commitment to fixed regular savings deposits can help individuals to achieve the welfare-maximising level of savings, when they would not be able to do so on their own. Such regular-instalment commitment products further increase welfare by smoothing savings contributions. The setting is enriched by endogenising take-up, and giving individuals the ability to choose their own commitment stakes. The results point to the possibility that the observed demand for costly informal savings devices may simply represent a demand for commitment savings products with fixed periodic contributions, as they are commonly offered by banks in rich countries.
Work in Progress
- Building Skills that Matter: Demand-driven job training and on-the-job support
with Martin Abel
- Self-Discrimination in Jobseeker Behaviour
with Frédéric Schneider
- The Role of Implicit Theories of Intelligence in Increasing Worker Retention
with Martin Abel
- Behavioural Barriers to Human Capital Investment - Evidence from French Jobseekers
Bruno Crépon, Esther Mbih, and Arne Uhlendorff
Older Work
Abstract
In light of the United Nations' latest urbanization projections, particularly with respect to China and India, a good understanding is needed of what drives aggregate urbanization trends. Yet, previous literature has largely neglected the issue in favor of studying urban concentration. Taking advantage of the latest UN World Urbanization Prospects, we use an instrumental variables approach to identify and analyze key urbanization determinants. We estimate the impact of GDP growth on urbanization to be large and positive. In answer to Henderson's (2003) finding that urbanization does not seem to cause growth, we argue that the direction of causality runs from growth to urbanization. We also find positive and significant effects of industrialization and education on urbanization, consistent with the existence of localization economies and labor market pooling.
Abstract
The paper argues that the incidence of moral hazard played a significant role in the 2007/2008 credit crunch. In particular, bank traders subjected to asymmetric compensation structures have an incentive to take excessive risks even when the bank's shareholders would prefer prudent investment. Traders' incentives are shown to be unaffected by capital regulations, with the associated financial burden falling upon the taxpayer through deposit insurance or government bail-outs. Selected case studies further indicate that the phenomenon of “gambling traders” was widespread during the credit crunch, when high bonuses tempted bank employees to invest in risky subprime-backed securities. The intransparency of structured products and the inaccuracy of credit ratings contributed to the employees' ability to conceal the underlying risk from the banks' shareholders. The analysis points to an urgent need to reform compensation practices in the financial sector.
Conferences and Talks
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2023February: European Development Research Network (EUDN) Annual Meeting, Geneva
February: JPAL Moroccan Employment Lab Symposium, Rabat
May: Behavioral Economics Annual Meeting (BEAM, Yale University)
July: International Conference on Development Economics (ICDE), Paris School of Economics
Past Talks
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2022IPA Financial Inclusion and Social Protection Meeting, Northwestern University
ESA Asia Pacific Meeting (Osaka)
ENS Paris-Saclay
Université Paris Panthéon-Assas
Maastricht Behavioral and Experimental Economics Symposium (M-BEES)
4th Reading Experimental and Behavioural Economics Workshop
12th International Conference of the French Association of Experimental Economics (Lyon)
2021May: Behavioral Economics Annual Meeting (BEAM, Cornell University)
RExCon21 Social Preferences and Social Norms (HSE Moscow)
TIBER Symposium (Tilburg)
ESSEC Business School (Paris)
IESEC Business School (Lille)
2020North East Universities Development Consortium (NEUDC, Dartmouth)
Economic Science Association (ESA) Global Meetings
DIAL-CREST Workshop (Paris)
University of Birmingham (Departmental Seminar)
2019BREAD Behavioral and Development Conference (Stanford)
Paris School of Economics (Development Seminar)
Copenhagen Business School (Departmental Seminar)
University of Exeter (Experimental Seminar)
University of Birmingham (Experimental Seminar)
ESA European Meeting (Dijon)
Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management (Rennes)
CSAE Conference (Oxford)
CASD-IAB Conference (Paris)
Behavioural Decision Sciences Workshop (Loughborough)
DIAL Development Conference (Paris)
EBCA: Behavioral and Cognitive Approaches to Entrepreneurship (Paris)
2018Yale University (Development Lunch Seminar)
Behavioral Science and Health Symposium (University of Pennsylvania)
Coller Conference on Behavioral Economics (CCBE), Tel Aviv
ESA World Meeting, Berlin
2017NBER-BREAD Winter Meeting
European Network Development Conference (EUDN)
AEA-ASSA Annual Meeting (poster)
RWI Essen Seminar
Maastricht Behavioral and Experimental Economics Symposium (M-BEES)
Econometric Society European Meeting (Lisbon, two papers)
CSAE Lunch Seminar (Oxford)
Blavatnik Departmental Seminar (Oxford)
CREST LMI-LEPP Seminar
Paris School of Economics (Development Lunch Seminar)
Berlin Youth Unemployment Conference (RWI, GIZ)2016Behavioral Economics Annual Meeting (BEAM), Cornell University (invited participant)
Summer Institute on Field Experiments (SIFE), University of Chicago (invited participant)
Passive Choices Workshop, University of Copenhagen
Econometric Society European Meeting, Geneva
IPA Gathering in Financial Inclusion, Yale University (participant)
CERMi Seminar, Universities of Brussels and Mons
2015Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE), Session 6: Psychology and Economics
Christmas Conference of the German Economists Abroad (GEA), Munich
Symposium on Economic Experiments in Developing Countries (SEEDEC), Prague
GATE-LAB Seminar, University of Lyon
European meeting of the Economic Science Association, Heidelberg
Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, Mannheim
Annual Meeting of the French Experimental Economics Association, Paris
London Experimental Workshop (LEW 2015)
Paris School of Economics (Economics & Psychology Seminar)
Annual Conference of the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), Oxford
École Polytechnique, Paris
UCSD Rady Spring School in Behavioural Economics, San Diego (participant)2014Pacific Conference for Development Economics (PacDev), UCLA
Institute for Fiscal Studies (EDePo Workshop), London
University of Western Ontario
University of Edinburgh
University of Konstanz
CREST-ENSAE Paris
International Conference of the Courant Research Centre on Poverty, Equity, and Growth, Göttingen
2013London School of Economics, STICERD Seminar
Annual International Conference of the Research Committee on Development Economics (Verein für Socialpolitik), MunichTeaching
Current Teaching (2019/20)
All teaching materials can be found on Pamplemousse.
Econometric Evaluation of Public Policies (ENSAE, Paris-Saclay)
Joint with Bruno Crépon
Development Microeconomics (ENSAE, Paris-Saclay)
Experimental and Behavioural Economics (ENSAE, Paris-Saclay)
Joint with Guillaume HollardOffice hour
Term time: By appointment (ENSAE, Office 4043).
Past Teaching
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2019 2016Development Economics (ENSAE)
with Jean-Noël Senne2019 2016Experimental and Behavioural Economics (ENSAE)
with Guillaume Hollard2019 2015Econometric Evaluation of Public Policies (ENSAE)
with Bruno Crépon2015 2014Econometric Evaluation of Public Policies (ENSAE)
with Pauline Givord2014 2012EC411 Microeconomics for MSc Students(LSE)
Course Guides2014 2012EC400 Statistics for MSc Students(LSE)
Course Guides2012 2009EC201 Microeconomic Principles(LSE)
Course GuidesContact
E-mail:
anett.john@ensae.fr
Telephone:
+33(0)1411 77713Address:
CREST
Building MK2, Office 2026
15 Boulevard Gabriel Peri
92245 Malakoff
France
